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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)

vs.

)

WESLEY ALLEN TUTTLE,

)

Defendant-Appellant.

)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant-Appellant, Wesley Allen Tuttle,
was charged by way of information with the crime of escape
from official custody, a second degree felony, in that he
escaped from official custody, to wit, confinement at the
Utah State prison.

Jury trial on the charges was duly begun

on May 29, 1985, and the verdict of guilty was returned on
May 30, 1985.

On that day, Judge Wilkinson sentenced the

Defendant to a period of one to fifteen years in the Utah
State prison.

Said sentence was to be consecutive to his

other sentence, and issued forthwith.
Mr. Tuttle had previously been convicted of
capital homicide, a first degree felony, and sentenced to

life imprisonment,

Purtherf his commitment issued and he

was received at the Utah State prison on May 24, 1984.

(See

Trial Exhibit No. lf Record at 104). However, there was no
evidence available from the state's witnesses as to any
post-sentence proceedings, such as a notice of appeal or
granting of a new trial, or parole status.

(Record at

108).
On August 31, 1984, Mr. Tuttle was working under
Mr. Gerald Dowson, vocational instructor, as an electrician.
He was assigned various jobs by Mr. Dowson in the prison.
(Record at 108).

On that day he was assigned with Mr.

Eugene Brady to repair some lights in the visiting room of
the medium security section of the prison.

(Record at

113). Mr. Tuttle could not have known of the exact location
of this assignment until that morning shortly before he was
sent.

(Record at 121).
Shortly after 9:00 a.m. on August 31, 1984, a

Mr. William Campbell, an accountant in the administrative
office of the prison, heard a lot of construction noise at
the fire escape door to the administration offices.

With

two female co-workers, Mr. Campbell went over to investigate
the noise after a "ridiculously long time".

(Record at 133).

Upon opening the door he saw one individual in civilian
overalls and two prison inmates, one of whom was Mr. Tuttle.
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Mr. Tuttle walked past Mr. Campbell and through the
administration offices out of the door.

He was shortly

followed by the other inmate, and after a brief conversation
with Mr. Campbell the man in the overalls also left through
the offices.

Further, Mr. Campbell testified that inmates

are often allowed beyond the check points and through the
offices there.

(Record at 135).

The State next called Officer Craig Rasmussen,
an Investigator.

He testified that he found Mr. Eugene

Brady in the bushes by the river, (Record at 154), saw the
other prisoner, Mr. Wood in custody on a road outside the
prison, (Record at 155), and next saw Mr. Tuttle in Las
Vegas when he brought him back from there.

(Record at

162).
The State then rested, and the defense began
calling witnesses for its case.

The first witness called by

the defense was Merril Barnes, Deputy Warden of the prison
at the time.

He testified that Mr. Tuttle had been outside

of the building with Mr. Dowson without authorization in the
past, (Record at 172), including outside the compound fence,
(Record at 173), confirming Mr. Dowson's previous testimony
as to those occurances.

(Record at 127-8).

Mr. Barnes

further testified as to his previous work as a social worker
in the prison, and that there is a different society in
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prison with its own ways and taboos, and that threats must
be considered real in prison.

(Record at 174-6).

The defense also called Charles Puett who was
an inmate at the Utah State prison at the time, having been
convicted of insufficent funds on a check.

He testifed that

he had seen Mr. Tuttle threatened a number of times, and
that people who were convicted of the crime Mr. Tuttle had been
were threatened a lot, and those threats were extremely serious.
(Record at 183-4).

He indicated that there had been one

murder and one stabbing in the last two months.

On cross

examination, he testified that he had seen a knife pulled on
Mr. Tuttle one of the times when he knew Mr. Tuttle had been
threatened.
The defense then called Mr. Darrell Eugene Brady,
a prisoner at the Utah State prison.
the

individuals

Mr. Brady was one of

who left the prison with Mr. Tuttle,

and was the one wearing the overalls that Mr. Campbell saw.
Mr. Brady and Mr. Tuttle were friends in the prison, and
they would "back each other up" as to any problems that
either of them would have.

(Record at 192).

Further,

any problem that was one of theirs was the other's problem
as well, as that was the way of the prison.

(Record at

202).
On the day that they left the prison, they were
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working in the visiting room.

Mr. Brady went to the bathroom,

and was informed by a fellow inmate that if he or Mr. Tuttle
went back down to the main corridor, someone was going to
get killed.

(Record at 195).

Mr. Brady then walked back

into the visiting room and told Mr. Tuttle "we have big
problems", grabbed a pry bar, and went through the visiting
room door into the visiting yard.

(Record at 197).

After

leaving the yard, they went through a gate that just happened
to be open, which they could not have known would have been
open.

They then went through an exterior door into the main

administration building, up through some steps, and were
attempting to break through the door when Mr. Campbell
opened it.

Further, Mr. Tuttle had merely followed Mr.

Brady after he told him of the trouble, and they had had no
contact until after the last door.

(Record at 199. )

The defense next called a Frank Saucedo who was
a fellow prisoner in the prison with Mr. Tuttle.

He testified

that he had been asked to be a back up for a fight that was
to occur the day that Mr. Tuttle left.

He and other individuals

were waiting for Mr. Tuttle and Mr. Brady to come back down
the hall at the lunch hour.

However, no fight occured as

Mr. Tuttle and Mr. Brady left the prison.

(Record at 206).

With that testimony, the defense rest.
On May 30, 1985, the Court discussed jury instructions
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with counsel for the parties, and ultimately instructed the
jury.

The Defendant requested

instruction on compulsion

which tracked the statue which sets forth the defense of
compulsion, located at Section 76-2-302, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended.
instruction, but

(Record at 38). The Court gave that
also

gave

the

Plaintiff's

Requested

Instruction Number 9, as modified, (Record at 51), ultimately
as the Court's instruction number 19, (Record at 68). This
instruction added additional elements to the defense of
compulsion not within the statute.
After argument by counsel, the jury went out and
after deliberating for approximately one hour, returned a
verdict of guilty.

The Defendant waived his right to be

sentenced not sooner than two days after conviction, and was
sentenced at that time for a period of one to fifteen years
in the Utah State prison, said sentence to be consecutive
to the one he was serving.

On the 27th day of June, 1985,

Notice of Appeal was duly filed in the District Court.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THAT THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED
THE JURY REGARDING THE DEFENSE OF COMPULSION.
The defense of compulsion is set forth in the

statutes in Section 76-2-302, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended.

In instructing the jury as to the defense of
-6-

compulsion, the trial court instructed as to the elements
contained within the statute to define the defense, and in
addition, place three other restrictions on the defense as
additional elements which must be born out before the
defense obtains.

It was improper to place these additional

burdens upon the Defendant in the defense of his case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THAT THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED
THE JURY REGARDING THE DEFENSE OF COMPULSION
Mr. Tuttle's defense at the time of trial was

compulsion.

The defense of compulsion is set forth in

Section 76-2-302, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
which states, in pertinent part:
A person is not guilty of an offense
when he engaged in the proscribed conduct
because he was coerced to do so by the
use or threatened imminent use of unlawful
physical force upon him or a third person,
which force or threatened force a person
of reasonable firmness in his situation
would not have resisted.
Pursuant to that, the Defendant requested
setting

an instruction

forth those elements, contained in Defendant's

Request Instructions Number 1.

This instruction was given

by the Court as its Instruction Number 18.
The Plaintiff, however, requested a different
Instruction on the defense of duress or compulsion, its
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proposed Instruction Number 9, (Record at 51).

The Court

deleted paragraph 3 from that proposed instruction, and gave
the remainder as Instruction Number 19.

(Record at 68).

None of these three additional elements and requirements for
the defense of compulsion appear anywhere within the statute
on compulsion.
The provisions of the Criminal Code dictate that
resort should be had solely to matters contained in the code
to determine what are the elements of the crimes and, where
listed, the elements of any defense.

Section 76-1-103, Utah

Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, provides, in pertinent
part:
The provisions of this code (Utah Criminal
Code) shall govern the construction of,
the punishment for, and defenses against
any offense defined in this code or,
except where otherwise specifically provided
or the context otherwise requires, any
offense defined outside this code; provided
such offense was committed after the
effective date of this code.
In the context of the case at bar, it is
constitutionally mandated that the trial judge not add
the additional elements to the defense of compulsion.
That is because by adding the additional elements to the
defense the defense was thereby narrowed, and thus the scope
of the criminal offenses would have been enlarged.
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In

essence, therefore, the trial court was expanding the
definition of a crime, which is not permissable.
Article 5 Section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides
for the three departments of government and the requirement
that one department shall not exercise the powers and
authorities of another department.

In the case at bar, the

definition of a crime is a legislative function, and the
Courts cannot enlarge upon that definition.

In State vs.

Johnson, 44 Utah 18, 137 P 632 (UT 1913), the Defendant was
convicted of a statute that provided that "every person who
is guilty of the infamoos crime against nature commited
with mankind or with animal, it is punishable by imprisonment
, . ."

The statutes of the state of Utah at that time did

not designated or mention a particular act as constituting
the crime.

The Supreme Court reveresed, on the basis that

it would in essence be a judicial definition of a crime and
a usurpation of the legislative function.

The Court stated

at Page 26:
This principal is also embedded in our
Constitution.
Section 1 of article 5 of
the Constitution of this state provides
that the "powers of the government of the
State of Utah shall be divided into three
distinct departments, the legislative, the
executive, and the judicial; and no person
charged with the exercise of the powers
properly belonging to one of these,
-9-

departments, shall exercise any functions
pertaining to either of the others, except
in the cases herein expressly directed or
permitted."
There is no provision of
the Constitution that either expressly
or otherwise directs or permits the
courts of this state to denounce and
punish as crimes acts and omissions
not made punishable by statute; hence
to do what we are urged would be in
violation of both the letter and the spirit
of the constitution.
The State vs. Johnson case was sited with approval
in State vs. Gallion, 572 P2d. 683 (UT 1977).

That case

also dealt with the "non-delegation doctrine" with regard
to a claim under the Controlled Substances Act.

The Act at

that time provided that all drugs listed on a particular
schedule were illegal under the Act, and provided that the
Attorney General of the State of Utah could add substances
to that list by administrative action.

The Court found that

to be an illegal and unconstitional delegation of legislative
power, and struck that provision of the Code.

Stating,

at Page 690:
A determination of the elements of a
crime and the appropriate punishment
therefor are, under our Constitutional
system, judgments, which must be made
exclusively by the Legislature.
See also 21 Amercian Jurispurdence 2nd, Criminal Law, Section
11, Page 124.
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The trial court in its instruction added three
elements to the defense of compulsion.

These were that: (1),

the Defendant was faced with a specific thread of substantial
body injury in the immediate future; (2), that there was not
time to make a complaint to the authorities, or there was
history of futile complaints; and (3), that the individual
immediately report to the authorities when he has obtained a
position of safety from the immediate threat. These factors
make actions before and after the time of the offense
relevant to a determination as to whether or not there had
been a crime committed.

Therefore/ even amongst themselves,

they are inconsistent with a definition of the crime.
However, they clearly go beyond the elements of the defense
of compulsion set forth in the statute, Section 76-2-302.
As such, they reduce the number of times when the defense
of compulsion applies, and thereby enlarges the times that
crimes are committed. As a result, it constitutes an improper
broadening of the definition of crimes and their defenses by
the judiciary as well as being contrary to the provisions of
the criminal code concerning the defintion of crimes and
the defenses thereto.

On both bases, it deprived the

Defendant of his right to have his defense presented to a
jury.
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CONCLUSION
The trial Court erred in failing to instruct the jury
properly with regard to the defense of compulsion.

It added

additional elements to the defense of compulsion not found
within the statute, thereby enlarging the definition and
ambit of those acts which are criminal.

Such was improper.

Since compulsion was the Defendant's only defense, this
Court should reverse the conviction and remand the case for
a new trial upon proper instructions.
DATED this

day of December, 1985.
ROBERTS & ROBERTS

By
THOM D. ROBERTS
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the

day of December,

1985, I hand delivered four copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S
BRIEF to David Wilkinson, Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent,
Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt
Lake City, Utah.
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76-8-309. Escape - Term for escape from state
prison. (1) A person is guilty of escape if he escapes from
official custody.
(2) The offense is a felony of the second degree if:
(a)

The actor employs force, threat, or a deadly

weapon against any person to effect the escape; or
(b)

The actor escapes from confinement in the

state prison.

Otherwise, escape is a class B misdemeanor.

(3)

"Official custody/1 for the purpose of this

sectionf means arrest, custody in a penal institution, jail,
an institution

for confinement of juvenile offenders, or

other confinement pursuant to an order of the Court.

For

purposes of this section a person is deemed to be confined
in the Utah state prison if he has been sentenced and
committed and the sentence has not been terminated or voided
or the prisoner is not on parole.
(4)

The term imposed upon a person escaping

confinement in the state prison shall commence from the time
that actor would otherwise have been discharged from the
prison on the term or terms which he was serving.

ADD-1

76-2-302.

Compulsion - (1) A person is not guilty

of an offense when he engaged in the proscribed conduct
because he was coerced to do so by the use or threatened
imminent use of unlawful physical force upon him or a third
person, which force or threatened force a person of reasonable
firmness in his situation would not have resisted*
(2)

The defense of compulsion provided by this

section shall be unavailable to a person who intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly places himself in a situation in
which it is probable that he will be subjected to duress,
(3)

A married woman is not entitled, by reason

of the presence of her husband, to any presumption of
compulsion or to any defense of compulsion except as in
subsection (1) provided.

ADD-2

INSTRUCTION

You are instructed that pursuant to the laws of the
State of Utah, it is a complete defense to the charge in this
case if the Defendant acted under compulsion.

Compulsion under

the law is when an individual engaged in prescribed conduct
because he was coerced to do so by the use or threatened imminent
use of unlawful physical force upon him, or a third person,
which force or threatened force a person of reasonable firmness
in tnat individual situation would not have resisted.
Therefore, unless the State proves to your satisfaction
and beyond a reasonable dojbt that the above elements of compulsion Jid not exist, it shall be your duty to return a verdict of
not guilty.

ADD-3
i

l

INSTRUCTION NO.
You are

instructed

that

the

l

defense

of

duress

or

compulsion is available only if the following conditions existed
at the time of the escape:
1.

The defendant was faced with a specific threat of

death or substantial bodily injury in the immediate future.
2.

There is not time for a complaint to authorities or

there exists a history of futile complaints which make any result
from such complaint illusory.
3.

The

prisoner

immediately

authorities when he has attained

reports

to

the

a position of safety

proper

from the

immediate threat.
If you

find beyond a reasonable doubt from your con-

sideration of all the evidence that all these conditions did not
exist at the time of the escape, then you should
defense of duress or compulsion

find that the

is not available to the defen-

dant .
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